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NOTES
ADMISSIBILITY OF HYPNOTICALLY ENCHANCED TESTIMONY IN
LOUISIANA
Three cases have for the first time brought to the attention of Loui-
siana courts the problem of whether hypnotically enhanced testimony
should be admitted at trial. In State v. Culpepper,' a first degree murder
case, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the hyp-
notically enhanced testimony of the sole eyewitness was inadmissible. In
another first degree murder case, State v. Wren,2 the Louisiana Supreme
Court declined to rule on the admissibility of hypnotically induced
testimony, based on the finding that the eyewitness's testimony had not
been changed by the hypnosis; the court affirmed the lower court's ad-
mission of the testimony. In a personal injury suit, Landry v. Bill Garrett
Chevrolet, Inc.,3 the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's admission of the plaintiff's hypnotically refreshed
testimony, holding that the admissibility of such testimony should be con-
ditioned upon the fulfillment of certain safeguards. The supreme court
reversed, disapproving of the fourth circuit's ruling in a terse opinion.4
This problem has received sporadic treatment in the case law and in
legal literature until the past two decades, during which there has been
a marked increase in court treatment and a veritable plethora of com-
mentary. This note will assess the shortcomings of hypnotically enhanced
testimony, analyze the approaches taken elsewhere, and suggest separate
solutions for civil cases and criminal cases in Louisiana.
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 434 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982). Apparently, the prosecution did not take
writs to the supreme court to contest the fifth circuit's ruling.
2. 425 So. 2d 750 (La. 1983). The supreme court followed this- ruling in the compan-
ion case in which an accomplice was tried. State v. Moore, 432 So. 2d 209 (La. 1983).
In a case which was published too late to allow textual treatment in this note, the supreme
court followed Wren on a set of facts very similar to those in Wren. State v. Goutro,
444 So. 2d 615 (La. 1984). In addition to authoring the majority opinion, Justice Lemmon
added in concurrence:
Until the Legislature or this court adopts a firm position regarding the ad-
missibility of testimony concerning matters recalled after hypnosis, law enforce-
ment officers and prosecutors should, at the least, be prepared to demonstrate
the content and degree of the witness' recall before hypnosis. Obviously, a writ-
ten or otherwise recorded statement (in as great detail as possible) should be taken.
Second, the hypnotic session itself should be recorded so that there is no question
as to the events recalled or the manner in which the hypnotic session was con-
ducted. Third, the hypnosis should be conducted by a qualified (and preferably
independent) hypnotist.
Id. at 618. Compare the safeguards suggested by this writer, infra text accompanying notes
145-50. See also infra note 132.
3. 430 So. 2d 1051 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
4. 434 So. 2d 1103, 1105 (La. 1983).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Hypnosis: Its Nature and Relationship to the Judicial System
Hypnosis has been defined as a sleeplike state which still permits a
wide range of behavioral responses to stimulation.'
The hypnotized individual appears to heed only. the communica-
tions of the hypnotist. He seems to respond in an uncritical,
automatic fashion, ignoring all aspects of the environment other
than those made relevant by the hypnotist. Apparently with no
will of his own, he sees, feels, smells, and tastes in accordance
with the suggestions in apparent contradiction to the stimuli that
impinge upon him. Even memory and awareness of self may be
altered by suggestion, and the effects of the suggestions may be
extended (posthypnotically) into subsequent waking activity.'
Hypnosis has also been described as an altered state of consciousness in
which the hypnotist-patient relationship is intense and extremely sensitive,
and in which, in effect, the subject abandons executive control over his
own ego.'
Hypnosis is now well established as a therapeutic technique in the
fields of medicine, psychiatry, and psychology,' and within the last two
decades forensic applications of hypnosis have dramatically increased.'
Such applications can most simply be categorized as in-court and out-of-
court uses. There have been very few attempts to use hypnosis in the
courtroom, the most notable being the Arthur Nebb case.' 0 Out of court,
5. 9 THE NEw ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA-MACROPAEDIA 133, 133 (15th ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA]. A detailed description of the historical
development and technical aspects and applications is beyond the scope of this note. However,
the legal and technical literature contains extensive and detailed discussions. See, e.g., id.;
Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 313, 316-21 (1980).
6. 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 5, at 133.
7. Warren & Roberts, Challenging the Use of Hypnotically Induced Evidence, 9 COLO.
LAW. 1142, 1144 (1980).
8. See Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. REV.
1203, 1206 (1981). See generally M. BRENMAN & M. GILL, HYPNOTHERAPY: A SURVEY OF
THE LITERATURE (1947); HANDBOOK OF HYPNOSIS AND PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE (G. Bur-
rows & L. Dennerstein eds. 1980).
9. This is reflected, inter alia, by the publication of handbooks for use by law en-
forcement agencies. See, e.g., H. ARONS, HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL INVESTOATION (1967); W.
BRYAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HYPNOSIS (1962); W. HIBBARD & R. WORRINO, FORENSIC HYP-
NOSIS, THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (1981); M.
REISER, HANDBOOK OF INVESTIGATIVE HYPNOSIS (1980).
10. State v. Nebb, No. 39,540 (Ohio C.P. Franklin County May 28, 1962), discussed
in Teitelbaum, Admissibility of Hypnotically Adduced Evidence and the Arthur Nebb Case,
8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205 (1963). Nebb was a prosecution for the first degree murder of the
alleged lover of the defendant's estranged wife. While the jury was temporarily excused,
a psychiatrist first testified that the statements of a person under hypnosis would, with
reasonable medical certainty, be truthful and correct. The defendant was put on the stand
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hypnosis has been used primarily as an evidence gathering or investigative
tool. 1,
While most of the early concern over the evidence gathering use of
hypnosis centered on its use in eliciting confessions or inculpatory
statements,12 evidence derived from or pertaining to the use of hypnosis
takes several forms: 3 (1) evidence as to the uses, techniques, effects, and
general reliability of hypnosis; (2) testimony by a witness who is under
hypnosis while on the stand; (3) record or transcript of pretrial statements
made under hypnosis; (4) testimony describing pretrial statements made
under hypnosis; (5) memories recalled or induced through pretrial hyp-
nosis; (6) opinions formed during pretrial hypnosis sessions as to the ac-
cused's guilt or state of mind or as to the reliability of statements made
under, or memories related to hypnosis; and (7) other types of evidence
such as expert testimony as to whether an alleged hypnotist has the per-
sonality characteristics required of a successful hypnotist. Of these, this
note will concentrate on recollection enhanced' through pretrial hypnosis
and hypnotized by the psychiatrist. The defendant testified that he did not see the deceased
in the room when he shot, at his estranged wife, and in response to questions from both
counsel, he related the same story he had previously given. The prosecution then moved
to amend the indictment and the defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser charge. The prosecutor
later stated that he reduced the charge because he was convinced by the statements given
under hypnosis that the defendant was telling the truth. Teitelbaum, supra, at 206-09. See
also, Comment, Hypnosis: Understanding Its Use in the Criminal Process, I I TEX. TECH
L. REV. 113, 133 (1979); Note, Hypnosis in Court: A Memory Aid for Witnesses, 1 GA.
L. REv. 268 (1967).
For a Canadian case, see Regina v. Pitt, 68 D.L.R.2d 513 (1969), discussed in Note,
Recent Cases, Criminal Law, 15 McGILL L.J. 189 (1969); see also Comment, Hypno-Induced
Statements: Safeguards for Admissibility, 1970 LAW & Soc. ORDER 99, 105-06, 113-14
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Hypno-Induced Statements].
11. See, e.g., Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of
Evidence Susceptible?, 38 Osno ST. L.J. 567, 580 (1977). The most frequently cited example
of investigative application is the Chowchilla kidnapping case in which one victim was hyp-
notized to enhance his recall of the license number on the kidnappers' van. A California
school bus was waylaid by three armed and masked men, who kidnapped the driver and
26 children. After all of the victims had escaped from the bus, which the kidnappers had
buried in an underground ditch, the driver was hypnotized to provide leads. He was able
to recall all but one of the digits of the license plate number of the kidnappers' van. This
information and a description of the van led to the apprehension of the kidnappers. The
Svengalic Squad, TIME, Sept. 13, 1976, at 56.
12. See Spector & Foster, supra note 11, at 581-82; see also Herman, The Use of Hypno-
Induced Statements in Criminal Cases, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. I, 40-55 (1964); Comment, Hypno-
Induced Statements, supra note 10, at 103-05.
13. See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 442 (1979) and authorities cited therein.
14. While the courts and commentators have variously used "refreshed," "induced,"
or "enhanced," sometimes interchangeably, "refreshed" should properly refer to recollec-
tion which is made more specific or more detailed by the hypnosis, while "induced" should
refer to recollection that is generated by the hypnosis where there was no recollection before.
Because it is the more general term and because it includes both "refreshed" and "in-
duced" recollection, "enhanced" will be used in this note.
1984]
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and will only treat the others as they might relate to the admissibility
of hypnotically enhanced recollection. One application not mentioned above
which has been given a significant amount of attention by law enforce-
ment agencies is witness preparation.' 5 As will be seen below, this ap-
plication has important consequences for the right of confrontation."
That hypnosis has significant value for investigative purposes is widely
accepted by the courts" and both by proponents' 8 and opponents' 9 of
evidentiary applications. Hypnosis has been used mainly by the prosecu-
tion in criminal cases for investigatory purposes, but such applications
should also be available to the defense, 0 for example, to serve as a basis
for expert opinion as to mental state or condition, or criminal intent,
or to uncover facts which would tend to support defendant's claim of
innocence.
15. See, e.g., Rothblatt, The Mental Probe Continued-Hypnosis and Witness Prepara-
tion, 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 615 (1981).
16. See infra text accompanying note 125.
17. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 67, 641 P.2d 775, 805, 181 Cal. Rptr.
243, 273, cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 13 (1982); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 218, 313 N.W.2d
648, 655 (1981).
18. See generally authorities cited supra note 9.
19. See, e.g., Orne, Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 327 (1979). Almost identical resolutions were adopted by the
Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis and the International Society of Hypnosis,
in 1978 and 1979, respectively. The former stated, in part:
The Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis views with alarm the ten-
dency for police officers with minimal training in hypnosis and without a broad
professional background in the healing arts employing hypnosis to presumably
facilitate recall of witnesses or victims privy to the occurrence of some crime.
Because we recognize thit hypnotically aided recall may produce either accurate
memories or at times may facilitate the creation of pseudomemories, or fantasies
that are accepted as real by subject and hypnotist alike, we are deeply troubled
by the utilization of this technique among the police. It must be emphasized that
there is no known way of distinguishing with certainty between actual recall and
pseudomemories except by independent verification.
For these and related reasons, the Society... is strongly opposed to the train-
ing of police officers as hypnotechnicians and the use of hypnosis by the police
officer. In those instances when hypnosis is appropriately used in law enforce-
ment, trained psychiatrists or psychologists with experience in the forensic use
of hypnosis should be employed . . . . The Society . . . views it as unethical
to train lay individuals in the use of hypnosis, to collaborate with laymen in the
use of hypnosis, or to serve as a consultant for laymen who are utilizing hypnosis.
Resolution, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOsIs 452 (1979). The other resolu-
tion was identical except for the name of the society. Id. at 453.
20. See In re Ketchel, 68 Cal. 2d 397, 438 P.2d 625, 66 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1968); Cornell
v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959). But see State ex rel. Sheppard
v. Koblentz, 174 Ohio St. 120, 187 N.E.2d 40 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 911 (1963).
On the use of hypnosis by the defense generally, see Warner, The Use of Hypnosis in the
Defense of Criminal Cases, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 417 (1979);
Comment, Hypnosis as a Defense Tactic, 1 TOLEDo L. Rav. 691 (1969).
NOTES
The difficulties arise when hypnosis is used to develop trial testimony
by the person who was hypnotized. There is no case law consensus on
whether testimony developed by means of pretrial hypnosis should be
admitted,"1 and there is a three-sided dispute among the commentators.
The proponents of evidence gathering uses of hypnosis consist largely of
hypnosis experts either attached to or closely associated with law enforce-
ment agencies. At the other extreme are those who argue that such uses
of hypnosis should be avoided and that the use of hypnosis renders the
subject incompetent to testify. A third, more moderate group consists of
professional psychiatrists, psychologists, and others who argue that the
disadvantages of hypnosis can effectively be counteracted by adherence
to strict safeguards.22 The dispute centers on the reliability of hypnosis
as a memory enhancement technique and on the importance of this
reliability for admissibility of the resulting testimony. The reliability of
hypnosis as a memory enhancement technique in turn depends on the
nature of human memory and on the nature and effects of hypnosis itself.
The proponents of hypnosis as a memory enhancement technique
generally take the view, implicitly or explicitly, that human memory
operates "like a giant tape recorder" 2 3 which records "every experience
from time of birth . . . [so] that these experiences and associated feelings
are available for replay today in as vivid a form as when they first
occurred." 2 ' This view of the nature of memory has been severely criticized
by others, who regard memory as restructuring "an event based on all
21. One writer has described the case law situation as a "cacophony of discordant
state decisions." Ruffra, Hypnotically Induced Testimony: Should It Be Admitted?, 19 CRIM.
L. BULL. 293, 293 (1983).
22. A leading proponent of the forensic use of hypnosis is Martin Reiser, who is direc-
tor of behavioral science services of the Los Angeles Police Department and director of
the Law Enforcement Hypnosis Institute in Los Angeles, which trains law enforcement per-
sonnel in hypnosis. For one of his more significant works, see M. REISER supra note 9.
The leading opponent of the forensic use of hypnosis is Dr. Bernard Diamond, who
gave expert testimony for the defense in State v. Wren. He is Professor of Law and Clinical
Professor of Psychiatry at the University of California. For his leading article on this sub-
ject, see supra note 5.
The most prominent representative of the third group is Dr. Martin T. Orne, who gave
expert testimony for the defense in Landry v. Bill Garrett Chevrolet, Inc. He is Professor
of Psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania and senior attending psychiatrist at the In-
stitute of Pennsylvania Hospital. For two examples of his work, see supra note 19; infra
note 31. This three-way argument is also reflected in the case law. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 43-103.
23. H. ARONs, supra note 9 at 35.
24. M. REISER, supra note 9, at 8 (footnote omitted) (citing W. PENFIELD & L. ROBERTS,
SPEECH AND BRAIN MECHANISMS (1959)). Such a view is also implicit in the "TV" technique
of hypnosis in which the subject is induced to reconstruct events as if he were viewing
them on a television monitor as played from a video-recording in which the subject's memory
is stored. This technique is frequently recommended by the proponents of forensic hyp-
nosis. See, e.g., id. at 204.
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the information available coupled with the person's general experience." 2
This reconstructive theory "posits that memory in any situation will
reconstruct a given event which may not correspond with the actual hap-
pening. Thus, original stored information can be lost and replaced with
totally inaccurate information.''26
The essence of hypnosis is suggestion: by its very nature it is a pro-
cess of suggestion" since the state of hypnosis could not be achieved
without suggestion. Under the reconstructive theory of memory, the im-
plication is that gaps and weaknesses in memory might be filled with sug-
gestions from the hypnotist. In addition to such "hypersuggestibility,"
hypnosis is characterized by "hypercompliance," or a desire to please
others, especially the hypnotist.28 A third characteristic of the hypnotic
state is that the subject undergoes a significant reduction in his critical
faculties or judgment. 9 This means that the subject's ability to distinguish
between accurate and inaccurate recollections is reduced, diminishing his
hesitation against guessing. 0 Moreover, hypersuggestibility and the nature
of memory combine with hypercompliance to produce confabulation, or
the subject's inclination "to fill in those aspects which the individual can-
not remember in an effort to comply with the suggestions of the
hypnotist."" However, "neither the subject nor the expert observer can
distinguish between confabulation and accurate recall in any particular
instance." 32 One reason for this inability is that suggestions can be made
by the hypnotist inadvertently, through the very subtle influence of at-
titude, tone of voice, body language, and demeanor." Also, the expecta-
tions of both the subject and the hypnotist are highly influential; belief
that the hypnosis will in fact produce accurate recollections can combine
25. Beaver, Memory Restored or Confabulated by Hypnosis-Is It Competent?, 6 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 155, 162 (1983) (footnote omitted). See also Hilgard & Loftus, Ef-
fective Interrogation of the Eyewitness, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS
342, 344 (1979).
26. Beaver, supra note 25, at 162-63 (footnotes omitted).
27. Amicus Curiae Brief of the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, State v. Mack,
292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980), reprinted in 2 SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL DEFENDING CRIMINAL
CASES: A PRACTICAL LOOK AT CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW 957, 972 (1979).
28. Levitt, The Use of Hypnosis to "Freshen" the Memory of Witnesses or Victims,
TRIAL, April 1981, at 56.
29. Orne, supra note 19, at 319; see also Levitt, supra note 28, at 56.
30. One writer has described this effect as an alteration of the subject's "guessing
strategy." See Orne, supra note 19, at 326.
31. Affidavit of Martin T. Orne filed with Motion of Amicus filed by California At-
torneys for Criminal Justice, Quaglino v. California, 439 U.S. 875 (1978) (cert. denied),
reprinted in 2 16TH ANNUAL DEFENDING CRIMINAL CASES: THE RAPIDLY CHANGING PRAC-
TICE OF CRIMINAL LAW 827, 837 (1978) [herinafter cited as Affidavit of Orne in 16TH AN-
NUAL]. See also Diamond, supra note 5, at 335.
32. Orne, supra note 19, at 320. See also Diamond, supra note 5, at 336-37; Affidavit
of Orne in 16TH ANNUAL, supra note 31, at 838-39.
33. Diamond, supra note 5, at 333.
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with the hypnotist's and the subject's awareness of information concern-
ing the events in question to produce pseudomemories which are consis-
tent with the facts already known. 3' Such dangers are greatest when the
subject is the victim of a crime for which the suspect has already been
apprehended. The danger is that the hypnosis will ratify or confirm the
authorities' choice of a suspect on the basis of such pseudomemories."1
Such distortions are subject to hardening or "cementing" 36 in the sense
that the subject's misapprehensions, including "the widely held belief that
hypnotic subjects 'cannot tell a lie,' [are] likely to give heightened credence
to testimony produced under hypnosis,"" especially where the witness
knows that the use of the hypnosis is intended to refresh his memory.
Added to these dangers are the problems of simulation and conscious
fabrication. Contrary to the positions taken by some proponents of forensic
uses of hypnosis, 8 there is some evidence that both of these can occur
and that simulation is difficult if not impossible to detect.39
The reliability of hypnosis as a memory enhancement technique is
seriously diminished by the problems of hypersuggestibility, hyper-
compliance, confabulation, inability of either the subject or hypnosis ex-
perts to distinguish confabulation from true recall, memory cementing,
simulation, and conscious fabrication. That the testimony of ordinary
eyewitnesses is also subject to the same or similar problems has become
a point of dispute as to whether such problems are sufficient to render
hypnotically enhanced testimony inadmissible.' Also, there is conflicting
empirical evidence on whether hypnosis actually is effective in enhancing
recall beyond that in the normal waking state." In fact, it has been sug-
34. Affidavit of Orne in 16TH ANNUAL, supra note 31, at 842-43.
35. Dilloff, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 OHIO N.U.L.
REv. 1, 18 (1977).
36. The term "memory cementing" was suggested in Comment, Hypnotically Enhanced
Testimony in Criminal Trials: Current Trends and Rationales, 19 Hous. L. Rsv. 765 (1982).
37. Warren & Roberts, supra note 7, at 1144.
38. See H. ARONS, supra note 9, at 137 (implication that simulation is easily detecti-
ble); W. BRYAN, supra note 9, at 245 (intentional lying while under hypnosis is extremely
difficult); W. HIBBARD & R. WORRINO, supra note 9, at 117 (implication that simulation
is easily recognizable).
39. See 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 5, at 139; Diamond, supra note 5,
at 336-37 (simulation is difficult if not impossible to detect); Margolin, Hypnosis Enhanced
Testimony: Valid Evidence or Prosecutor's Tool, TRIAL, October 1981, at 42, 44; Spector
& Foster, supra note 11, at 577.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 49-58.
41. See Loftus & Loftus, On the Permanence of Stored Information in the Human
Brain, 35 Am. PSYCHOLOOIST 409, 415 (1980) ("There exists no evidence to support the view
that recall during a state of hypnosis is any more accurate or complete than recall under
ordinary waking condition."); Putnam, Hypnosis and Distortions in Eyewitness Testimony,
27 INT'L J. CUNICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 437 (1979) (hypnotized subjects committed
significantly more errors on leading questions than did subjects in waking state). But see
Shafer & Rubio, Hypnosis to Aid the Recall of Witnesses, 26 INT'L J. CLINICAL & Ex-
PERIMENTAL HYPNosIS 81 (1978) (hypnosis enhances recall over that of normal waking state).
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gested that hypnosis tends to change the witness's "response
characteristics" rather than to improve his or her memory.
4
1
Treatment in the Courts-Other Jurisdictions
Generally, three approaches have been recognized by courts address-
ing the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony:43 (1) admissibility
per se, (2) exclusion per se, and (3) conditional admissibility. The cases
which exclude such testimony can further be divided into those which ex-
clude only the testimony based on posthypnotic recall" and those which
go so far as to exclude all testimony by a previously hypnotized witness."
Admissibility Per Se
The decisions holding that hypnotically enhanced testimony is admissi-
ble per se are predominantly state criminal cases." The basic conclusion
of these decisions is that the use of hypnosis does not render the witness
incompetent, and that the witness's having been hypnotized is a matter
of credibility for the jury rather than one of admissibility. 7 These courts
reject the argument that hypnosis renders the witness's testimony inherently
untrustworthy.4 8 The theoretical basis of this approach is twofold: first,
it is argued that hypnotically induced testimony is not sufficiently dif-
ferent from ordinary eyewitness testimony to justify different treatment
in that the memory distortions attributable to the use of hypnosis may
not be different from those which characterize ordinary eyewitness
testimony;49 second, it is argued that the use of hypnosis as a memory
42. Levitt, supra note 28, at 57.
43. Landry v. Bill Garrett Chevrolet, Inc., 430 So. 2d 1051, 1054-55 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), revd, 434 So. 2d 1103, 1105 (La. 1983); Falk, Posthypnotic Testimony-Witness Com-
petency and the Fulcrum of Procedural Safeguards, 57 ST. JoHN'S L. REV. 30, 35 (1982);
see also People v. District Court, 652 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1982) (en banc).
44. See infra text accompanying note 65.
45. See infra text accompanying note 64.
46. Federal civil cases include Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975);
Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974). Federal criminal cases in-
clude United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 385 (1979);
United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978). State criminal cases include Clark
v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Temony, 45 Md. App. 569,
414 A.2d 240 (1980); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 949 (1969) (both Temony and Harding have been overruled by Collins v. State,
52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982)); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d
414 (1978); State v. Jorgenson, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971); Chapman v. State,
638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1979); State v.
McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 119, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427 (1978).
48. Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509 (9th Cir. 1974).
49. See, e.g., Comment, The Admissibility of Polygraph and Hypnotic Evidence to
Test the Credibility of a Witness, 1982 DEr. C.L. REV. 97, 122-23; Note, The Continuing
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refreshing technique is no different from the usually accepted techniques
of restoring recollection,50 and thus "[if] the memory may be restored
by examining a document while on the stand or through the use of leading
questions, memory restored through the use of hypnosis should also be
admissible."'
The admissibility per se approach has been heavily criticized both by
commentators and by courts which have adopted the other two approaches.
After noting that ordinary eyewitness testimony and that of previously
hypnotized witnesses share many infirmities, one commentator stated that
"this ignores the fact that the witness encounters these same problems
to a much greater extent while under hypnosis than in a normal inter-
rogation, even given stringent procedural safeguards." 52 The commentator
argued that to admit hypnotically refreshed testimony unconditionally just
because the courts cannot eliminate the problems of ordinary eyewitness
testimony (and thus have no choice but to admit it) is not justifiable,
and further concluded that "we should work toward minimizing these
problems, not compounding them by allowing testimony conceded to be
extremely unreliable."" Another commentator argued that hypnotically
refreshed testimony is "categorically different" from ordinary eyewitness
recall because the previously hypnotized witness is testifying to something
which he could not remember even with normally tainted recall, and hyp-
notically refreshed testimony cannot be regarded as equivalent to normal
testimony since it is aided and thus further tainted by the inherently sug-
gestive process of hypnosis.5 ' Courts have also expressly rejected the no-
tion that the two types of recall are comparable. 5 Some criticism has
centered on the hardening effect of hypnosis on the witness's subjective
belief in the accuracy of his hypnotically refreshed recall. It is argued
that by giving the witness an unrealistic degree of confidence in his
Controversy of Hypnosis in the Legal Setting-The Need for a More Flexible Approach,
12 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 471, 509-10 (1982). For discussions of the untrustworthiness and
associated infirmities of ordinary eyewitness testimony, see Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony,
Sci. Am., December 1974, at 23, reprinted in 15 JURIMETRICS J. 171 (1974-1975); Loftus,
Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, December 1974,
at 116, reprinted in 15 JURIMoETlCS J. 188 (1974-1975).
50. Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1975). The usual methods
of refreshing recollection include the use of leading questions, see 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 777, at 169 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970); McCORMICK'S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 9, at 10 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]; written memoranda, and items other than writings. J.
WIGMORE, supra, § 758, at 125-26.
51. Comment, supra note 49, at 123.
52. Comment, supra note 36, at 788-89 (footnotes omitted).
53. Id. at 789.
54. Beaver, supra note 25, at 190; see also Diamond, supra note 5, at 341-42.
55. See, e.g., State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 217, 313 N.W.2d 648, 654 (1981); People
v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 542, 453 N.E.2d 484, 494, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 265 (1983).
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testimony, hypnosis makes it extremely difficult if not impossible for the
trier of fact to assess the witness's credibility" properly and renders the
opponent's cross-examination less effective." In addition, it is feared that
the factfinder will be unduly impressed with the results of hypnosis."
Exclusion Per Se
The courts taking the exclusion per se approach have applied the
"general acceptance" standard of Frye v. United States," or some varia-
tion of it, to the use of hypnosis as a memory enhancement technique.
6
0
The general conclusion is that hypnosis has not gained a sufficiently
widespread acceptance by the scientific community as a reliable method
of restoring recall,6' which conclusion is largely based on a consideration
of the memory distortions and other problems discussed earlier.6 2 An ad-
ditional problem considered by some of these courts is the possibility that
the trier of fact will assign uncritical and absolute reliability to the results
of a scientific technique without considering its defects. 63 These courts
all reach the conclusion that testimony based on hypnotically refreshed
recall is inadmissible per se, but they reach different conclusions as to
the admissibility of testimony based on pre-hypnosis recall. In a minority
of one, the California Supreme Court has held that the previously hyp-
notized witness is incompetent to testify on all matters related to the events
which were treated in the hypnosis interview, regardless of whether they
were recalled before or after the interview. 6' In what appears to be the
56. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 109, 436 A.2d 170, 177 (1981);
Barr & Spurgeon, Testimony by Previously Hypnotized Witnesses: Should It Be Admissi-
ble?, 18 IDAHO L. REV. Ill (1982).
57. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 105, 436 A.2d 170, 174 (1981);
Note, Safeguards Against Suggestiveness: A Means for Admissibility of-Hypno-Induced
Testimony, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 197, 203 (1981).
58. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
59. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye the court stated that "while courts will go
a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014.
60. See, e.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 195-201, 644 P.2d
1266, 1281-87 (1982); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 51-54, 641 P.2d 775, 794-96, 181
Cal. Rptr. 243, 263-65, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 13 (1982).
61. See, e.g., Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982) (overruling
State v. Temony, 45 Md. App. 569, 414 A.2d 240 (1980)); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App.
230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968); see supra text accompanying note 46; People v. Gonzales, 415
Mich. 615, 626, 329 N.W.2d 743, 748 (1982), modified, 417 Mich. 968, 336 N.W.2d 751
(1983); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 218, 313 N.W.2d 648, 655 (1981); Commonwealth
v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 110, 436 A.2d 170, 178 (1981).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 27-42.
63. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 102, 436 A.2d 170, 173 (1981);
cf. State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 981 (La. 1979).
64. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 66-68, 641 P.2d 775, 804-05, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
273-74, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3 (1982). The Michigan Supreme Court has not yet decided
majority view on this issue, several courts have held that the use of pretrial
hypnosis does not render the witness incompetent to testify as to matters
recalled prior to the hypnosis.
6
1
In other decisions, courts have adopted what might be called "condi-
tional competency." The witness may testify as to his or her pre-hypnosis
recall but only after the proponent has first made a preliminary showing.
This showing varies from court to court; some require that the proponent
establish exactly what the witness recalled prior to the hypnosis.6 In ad-
dition, one court requires that the proponent show that the hypnosis was
not so impermissibly suggestive as to require exclusion of the pre-hypnosis
based testimony. 67 Another court requires that the proponent show that
the hypnosis was conducted in a manner designed to minimize the risks
of suggestion, that the pre-hypnosis recall be recorded in written, audio,
or video form, and also strongly recommends that the hypnosis session
itself be recorded. 68 Finally, one other court has required the fulfillment
of the safeguards required in State v. Hurd," discussed below, before
hypnosis can even be used for investigative purposes. 0
The Frye test has been heavily criticized in nearly all of its
applications,' including its use in the hypnosis context." In the latter
instance, the most frequent criticism has been that the test deals with scien-
tifically based expert opinion rather than eyewitness testimony.' 3 One
on the admissibility of testimony based on pre-hypnosis recall. People v. Gonzales, 415
Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982), modified, 417 Mich. 968, 336 N.W.2d 751 (1983).
65. Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d
764, 771 (Minn. 1980); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 218, 313 N.W.2d 648, 655 (1981).
66. Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 530, 447 N.E.2d 1190, 1198 (1983); People
v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 545-46, 453 N.E.2d 484, 495-96, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 266-67 (1983).
67. People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 547, 453 N.E.2d 484, 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255,
266-67 (1983).
68. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 210, 644 P.2d 1266, 1296
(1982); see also People v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710, 711 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (previously
hypnotized witness is competent to testify on matters recalled prior to hypnosis where those
matters were "unequivocally disclosed and recorded" in audio, written, or video form).
69. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). For the safeguards required in Hurd, see infra
note 89.
70. Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 205-06, 447 A.2d 1272, 1283 (1982).
71. See Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States,
A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1206 (1980), and authorities cited therein.
72. See, e.g., Comment, Hypnosis: A Survey of Its Legal Impact, 1I Sw. U.L. REV.
1421, 1444 (1979); Note, supra note 49, at 518.
73. See, e.g., Note, supra note 8, at 1217. But see Note, Hypnotically Induced Testimony:
The Pendulum Swings Towards Admissibility-Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 15 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 1372 (1981). The writer states:
The principal concern of Frye is the reliability of the scientific process itself.
Regardless of whether an expert in hypnosis or the subject of the hypnotic pro-
cedure testifies, the premise of the Frye rule remains equally applicable: the pro-
cess must still meet certain standards of reliability before a court admits the results
into evidence.
Id. at 1381 (footnotes omitted). See also Comment, supra note 72, at 1444 ("While there
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especially effective argument against the application of Frye in the con-
text of hypnotically enhanced testimony is that the reliability of evidence
should not solely determine admissibility. 4 This is reflected in the ap-
proach to scientific evidence advocated by Professor McCormick 7 and
followed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Catanese,'6 in which
the probative value is balanced against the risk of misleading the jury,
unfair surprise, and undue consumption of time. This general approach
to the admissibility of any evidence is consistent with the principles ex-
pressed in Federal Rules of Evidence 401-403, but it has been criticized
for "its failure to recognize the distinctive problems of scientific
evidence." 77 Also, this approach fails to allow for the possibility that
neither the judge nor the jury will be able to assess adequately the oppos-
ing arguments of the expert witnesses used by both sides in a dispute. 8
There is much argument as to whether the testimony having been hyp-
notically enhanced would unduly impress the jury in such a way that it
would assign excessive weight to the testimony. One writer argues that
because hypnosis is still surrounded by mystery and misunderstanding,
"[a]ttorneys, judges, and juries are as prey to the common misconcep-
tions about hypnosis as are law enforcement officers . . . . [and that]
they are likely to be strongly impressed by the fact that the certainty of
the witness was brought about by this powerful technique." 9 Another
author cites two studies which indicate that such an effect is greatly
exaggerated.8 Yet others argue that a "[florceful instruction regarding
the proper role of hypnosis as a memory aid rather than as an indicator
of truth should adequately safeguard the jury's ability to gauge
credibility."'" It has also been argued that such an impact on the jury
can be mitigated by expert testimony on the reliability of hypnosis as a
memory enhancer.82
are material distinctions between evidence resulting from a hypnotically revived memory
and [evidence] generated electronically, the former should be subjected to the same reliabil-
ity standards."); Beaver, supra note 25, at 187.
74. See, e.g., Spector & Foster, The Utility of Hypno-Induced Statements in the Trial
Process: Reflections on People v. Smrekar, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 691, 695 n.20 (1979)
("Accuracy and truthfulness of proposed testimony are not inflexible prerequisites for ad-
missibility; evidence which may be inaccurate or which tends to deceive is not automatically
excluded.").
75. MCCORMICK ON EVIDFNCE, supra note 50, §§ 202-203.
76. 368 So. 2d 975, 979 (1979).
77. Gianelli, supra note 71, at 1250.
78. Id. at 1236-38.
79. Levitt, supra note 28, at 58.
80. Comment, supra note 49, at 119-20.
81. Spector & Foster, supra note 11, at 595; see also Dilloff, supra note 35, at 9.
82. Note, The Use of Hypnosis to Refresh Memory: Invaluable Tool or Dangerous
Device?, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1059, 1085 & n.167 (1982) (citing Loftus, Psychological Aspects




The courts taking the conditional admissibility approach generally
recognize the unreliability of hypnosis in refreshing recollection but reject
the notion that its use for such a purpose renders the witness's testimony
inadmissible per se. These courts are concerned that an exclusion per se
approach may result in the exclusion of some relevant evidence that may
be as trustworthy as ordinary eyewitness testimony. 3 Instead of excluding
such testimony, such courts hold that the issue of admissibility is for the
judge to determine on the basis of the evidence provided by the propo-
nent, and that the testimony is admissible if the judge "finds that the
use of hypnosis in the particular case was reasonably likely to result in
recall comparable in accuracy to normal human recall."" 4 In some cases
the court applied the Frye "generally accepted" test or some variation
thereof and found that hypnosis is generally accepted as a reasonably
reliable technique of restoring recall "[i]f it is conducted properly and
used only in appropriate cases."" In other cases, the courts rejected the
applicability of the Frye test and applied either a balancing process similar
to that of Federal Rule of Evidence 403,86 or a "not impermissibly sug-
gestive" test derived from the standards developed for evaluation of pretrial
identification procedures.8"
In each of these cases, however, the burden is on the proponent to
come forth in a pretrial hearing with evidence necessary to convince the
court that the testimony should be admitted at trial." This burden generally
can be satisfied by demonstrating that certain safeguards have been ful-
filled, such as those developed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Hurd
83. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 541, 432 A.2d 86, 94 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97
N.M. 682, 688, 643 P.2d 246, 250-52 (1981); see also State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732,
649 P.2d 845 (1982).
84. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 543, 432 A.2d 86, 95 (1981).
85. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 538, 432 A.2d 86, 92 (1981).
86. Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
87. State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 571-73, 329 N.W.2d 386, 394-95, cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 2125 (1983). See generally Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Simmons
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
88. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). The court stated:
Whenever a party in a criminal trial seeks to introduce a witness who has
undergone hypnosis to refresh his memory, the party must inform his opponent
of his intention and provide him with the recording of the session and other per-
tinent material. The trial court will then rule on the admissibility of the testimony
either at a pretrial hearing or at a hearing out of the jury's presence.
86 N.J. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95 (footnote omitted). The purpose of this hearing would be
to determine "whether the use of hypnosis and the procedure followed in the particular
case was a reasonably reliable means of restoring the witness' memory." In making this
review, the court is to consider both the kind of memory loss involved and the specific
hypnosis technique used. See also State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 570, 329 N.W.2d
386, 394, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2125 (1983).
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to serve as threshhold admissibility requirements, the other purposes of
which were to "provide an adequate record for evaluating the reliability
of the hypnotic procedure, and to ensure a minimum level of reliability." 89
89. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). The court stated:
First, a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis must
conduct the session. This professional should also be able to qualify as an expert
in order to aid the court in evaluating the procedures followed ...
Second, the professional conducting the hypnotic session should be indepen-
dent of and not regularly employed by the prosecutor, investigator, or
defense ...
Third, any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement personnel
or the defense prior to the hypnotic session must be recorded, either in writing
or another suitable form ...
Fourth, before inducing hypnosis the hypnotist should obtain from the subject
a detailed description of the facts as the subject remembers them. The hypnotist
should carefully avoid influencing the description by asking structured questions
or adding new details.
Fifth, all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject must be recorded ...
The use of videotape, the only effective record of visual cues, is strongly en-
couraged but not mandatory.
Sixth, only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during any phase
of the hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing and the post-hypnotic
interview.
86 N.J. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97 (footnote omitted). Compare the safeguards advocated
by Martin Orne:
A. Hypnosis should be carried out by a psychiatrist or psychologist with special
training in its use. He should not be informed about the facts of the case ver-
bally; rather, he should receive a written memorandum outlining whatever facts
he is to know, carefully avoiding any other communication which might affect
his opinion. Thus, his beliefs and possible bias can be evaluated. It is extremely
undesirable to have the individual conducting the hypnotic sessions to have any
involvement in the investigation of the case. Further, he sould [sic] be an in-
dependent professsional not responsible to the prosecution or the investigators.
B. All contact of the psychiatrist with the individual to be hypnotized should
be video taped from the moment they meet until the entire interaction is com-
pleted. ...
Prior to the induction of hypnosis, a brief evaluation of the patient should
be carried out and the psychiatrist should then elicit a detailed description of
the facts as the witness or victim remembers them. . . .The psychiatrist should
strive to avoid adding any new elements to the witness's description of his ex-
periences, including those which he had discussed in his wake state, lest he in-
advertently alter the nature of the witness's memories--or constrain them by remind-
ing him of his waking memories.
C. No one other than the psychiatrist and the individual to be hypnotized should
be present in the room before and during the hypnotic session. . . . If either
the prosecution or the defense wish [sic] to observe the hypnotic session, they
may do so without jeopardizing the integrity of the session through a one-way
screen or on a television monitor.
D. Because the interactions which have preceded the hypnotic session may well
have a profound effect on the sessions themselves, tape recordings of prior inter-
rogations are important to document that a witness had not been implicitly or
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Other courts using this general approach adopted these or similar
safeguards.90 In addition to the guidelines aimed at the pretrial phase,
these courts have adopted some procedural requirements to be followed
should the testimony be admitted: the opponent should be allowed to at-
tack the reliability of the particular procedure used by introduction of
expert testimony at trial, but he may not attempt to prove the general
explicitly cued pertaining to certain information which might then be reported
for apparently the first time by the witness during hypnosis.
Affidavit of Orne in 16TH ANNUAL, supra note 31, at 853-55. Orne further emphasized that
these safeguards "are necessary whenever there is any possibility that a witness or victim
would be asked to testify in court as an eyewitness." Id. at 855.
90. In State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (1981), the court adopted all
six of the Hurd safeguards and added the following procedural requirement:
For purposes of cross examination, pursuant to N.M. Evidence Rule 612, an
adverse party is entitled to have the electronic tape or other proper record of
the hypnosis session produced for inspection and copying in advance of trial,
to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce into evidence those por-
tions which relate to the testimony of the witness.
97 N.M. at 690, 643 P.2d at 254.
In Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), the court adopted some
but not all of the Hurd safeguards and added others: (1) the hypnotist should be neutral
and detached. It is desirable but not necessary that the hypnotist be a trained mental health
expert, psychiatrist, or psychologist; (2) the session should be at an independent location;
(3) only the hypnotist and the subject should be present; others should be allowed to observe
via a one-way mirror or television monitor; (4) the hypnotist should examine the subject
before hypnosis to get every detail of the latter's pre-hypnosis recall; (5) the hypnotist should
examine the subject for any mental or physical disorder or condition that might affect the
session; (6) some kind of record should be made of the session, preferably but not necessarily
video; (7) the hypnotist should avoid any reassuring remarks which might assist in stimulating
confabulation; and (8) the court should consider carefully whether there is any evidence
corroborative or contradictory of the hypnotically induced recall. Id. at 91-93. However,
the same court, in Key v. State, 430 So. 2d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), adopted the
approach taken in Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982), thus apparently overrul-
ing Brown. Cf. State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 571 n.23, 329 N.W.2d 386, 394 n.23,
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2125 (1983) (court recommended that Orne's safeguards be used,
noted that they were not mandatory, and stated that the judge's task would be facilitated
by the use of those or similar safeguards). One should compare Oregon's statutory treat-
ment of hypnotically induced testimony, which appears to be the only one of its kind.
If either prosecution or defense in any criminal proceeding in the State of Oregon
intends to offer the testimony of any person, including the defendant, who has
been subjected to hypnosis . . . relating to the subject matter of the proposed
testimony, performed by any person, it shall be a condition of the use of such
testimony that the entire procedure be recorded either on videotape or any
mechanical recording device. The unabridged videotape or mechanical recording
shall be made available to the other party or parties . . ..
OR. REV. STAT. § 136.675 (1981). See also OR. REv. STAT. § 136.685 (1981) (requires police
to advise subject of the potential effects of hypnosis and that he is free to refuse to be
the subject, and requires that the subject's consent be obtained before using hypnosis); OR.
REV. STAT. § 136.695 (1981) (evidence obtained in violation of sections 136.675 and 136.685
is inadmissible in any criminal case).
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unreliability of hypnosis as a memory refreshment technique; the oppo-
nent should be allowed to introduce into evidence those portions of the
record of the hypnosis session which relate to the witness's testimony;92
the opponent should be allowed great leeway in his cross-examination of
the witness, and a cautionary instruction should be given to the jury, warn-
ing of the potential effects of hypnosis." Some of the courts which have
adopted the admissibility per se approach, recognizing the dangers involved
in the use of hypnosis, have recommended the same or similar standards,
but only as factors to be considered in assessing the witness's credibility
rather than as prerequisites for competency or admissibility.9 4
The conditional admissibility approach, with its reliance on certain
safeguards, does appear to have advantages over the admissibility per se
approach. Conditional admissibility would provide a means of determin-
ing in any given case at a pretrial hearing whether the probative value
of the testimony outweighs its potential prejudicial effects.9 One assump-
tion inherent in the conditional admissibility approach is that under the
proper circumstances, hypnotically enhanced testimony would have some
probative value. Another assumption is that with the proper procedural
safeguards, the built-in safeguards of the adversary system should make
it possible for the factfinder to properly determine the weight to be given
to the evidence. As adopted by some courts, conditional admissibility also
has some appeal because of the requirements of notice to the other party
and access by the opponent to the records of the hypnosis session.
The conditional admissibility approach has been criticized primarily
on the ground that it provides only a partial solution to the problems
inherent in the use of hypnosis to refresh memory; it fails to address the
problems of the subject's loss of critical judgment, confusion, and in-
ability of the subject and the hypnotist to distinguish between real memory
and confabulation, and the subject's unwarranted belief in the accuracy
of the hypnotically refreshed recall." In addition, there may be a prac-
tical problem in implementing workable safeguards. Such implementation
arguably would make excessive demands on judicial resources and time
because of "elaborate demands for discovery, parades of expert witnesses,
and special pretrial hearings," 9 all of which would result in undue delay
91. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 543, 432 A.2d 86, 95 (1981).
92. State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 690, 643 P.2d 246, 254 (1981).
93. Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). There is nothing
in Key v. State, 430 So. 2d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), which suggests that this part
of Brown was rejected.
94. See, e.g., Key v. State, 430 So. 2d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
95. See FED. R. EvID. 403; see also Note, supra note 8, at 1221.
96. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 39, 641 P.2d 775, 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 255,
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 13 (1982); see also Ruffra, supra note 21, at 313-16.
97. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 39, 641 P.2d 775, 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 255,
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 13 (1982).
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and confusion of the issues, some waste of time, and the potential for
misleading the jury. One court has taken the view that these problems,
when combined with those associated with the difficulty of overcoming
the "clear and convincing" standard of proof, the potential for bias when
the witness is emotionally involved in the outcome of the trial, and the
potential for a "panoply of new claims that could be raised on appeal,"
are such that "the game is not worth the candle." 98
Because the subject is the single most important variable in the use
of hypnosis,99 it can be argued that the use of safeguards is only partially
helpful since they are aimed only at the hypnotist or anyone other than
the subject himself. 0 Additionally, recording the hypnosis session arguably
would be inadequate because it would not include events before and after
the session which might significantly affect the outcome, and even if those
prior and subsequent events could somehow be recorded, the mere act
of recording them would affect the subject's attitudes and behavior.'0 '
Finally, the use of experts in attacking or supporting the credibility of
hypnotically enhanced testimony could be ineffective because "there exist
no means to determine with certainty whether or not such falsity or distor-
tion has been introduced by hypnotism," ' even in the case of those who
are highly skilled in the therapeutic and diagnostic use of hypnosis, and
especially in the case of "[liaw-enforcement-oriented author-hypnotists,
police staff psychologist[s], and policeman-hypnotists."'0 3
The Louisiana Position
Criminal Cases
In State v. Culpepper, the only eyewitness to a murder was hypno-
tized to refresh his recollection so that he could identify the murderer.
The defendant sought to limit the witness's testimony to what the witness
had recalled prior to the hypnosis, but the trial court denied the defen-
dant's motion to supress the witness's identification testimony. 0° Revers-
ing, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal applied the rationale
of State v. Catanese," in which the Louisiana Supreme Court used a
balancing approach in holding that polygraph results are inadmissible in
criminal trials. In reaching the conclusion that the probative value of such
evidence was outweighed by the reasons for its exclusion, the court in
98. See FED. R. EVID. 403; see also Note, supra note 8, at 1221.
99. Dilloff, supra note 35, at 5.
100. People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 541, 453 N.E.2d 484, 493, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255,
265 (1983).
101. Diamond, supra note 5, at 339.
102. Id. at 340.
103. Id. at 341.
104. 434 So. 2d 76, 77-78 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982).
105. 368 So. 2d 975 (La. 1979).
1984] 1055
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Catanese reasoned that the factfinder is likely to assign nearly conclusive
weight to the opinion of a polygraph expert; that the quality of such
evidence depends on the availability of examiners with sufficient training,
experience, and integrity; that there is not an adequate supply of such
experts presently subject to effective control by the judiciary, the
legislature, or the adverse parties; that were there to be an adequate supply
of such experts, admission of such evidence would require extensive pro-
cedural safeguards as prerequisites for admission, and finally that there
has been insufficient judicial experience with polygraph evidence to pro-
vide "an adequate basis for judicial rulemaking on this scale."'" 6
After finding that the "inherent hazards in the use of hypnotically
refreshed testimony are very similar to the dangers noted in Catanese in
the use of polygraph evidence,"' 0 7 the fifth circuit held that the reasons
given in Catanese for excluding polygraph evidence should apply to hyp-
notically refreshed testimony. It might be argued that hypnosis and the
polygraph are not analogous techniques: the latter is designed to deter-
mine the truth of the subject's statements, while the former, at least in
the present context, is designed only to elicit additional information from
the subject, regardless of its truth.' 8 However, this criticism loses much
of its force when it is noted that the court in Culpepper, rather than
comparing the results of each technique, compared the effects of each
on the factfinder, the need in each for highly qualified examiners or hyp-
notists, and the insufficiency of judicial experience with each to permit
adequate rulemaking to provide safeguards.
On these bases, the fifth circuit found that the probative value of
hypnotically refreshed testimony was outweighed by the reasons for its
exclusion.' On the usefulness of hypnosis, the court noted that "its value
in the courtroom has not been so clearly established as to outweigh the
potential for abuse and misuse at the expense of the accused."" '  The
court examined the details of the hypnosis procedure used in this case
and found it to be sufficiently suggestive"' to justify a finding that defen-
dant's due process rights were violated." ' On this basis the court held
106. Id. at 982.
107. Culpepper, 434 So. 2d at 83.
108. See, e.g., Spector & Foster, supra note 11, at 584; Comment, Hypnosis-Its Role
and Current Admissibility in the Criminal Law, 17 WILLAMErrE L. REV. 665, 673 (1981).
109. 434 So. 2d at 83.
110. Id.
111. There was no compliance with any safeguards recommended by the courts in other
jurisdictions; the hypnotist was a police officer, minimally trained in the use of hypnosis
and actively engaged in the investigation; and no identification was made until after the
hypnosis. Id. at 83.
112. "[T]he excessively suggestive identification procedure incorporating the use of hyp-
nosis is so likely to produce a misidentification that we are compelled to decide that the
due process rights of the defendant have been violated." Id.
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that "all testimony derived as a result of the hypnotic session" ' 13 would
be excluded, and limited the witness's testimony to matters recalled prior
to the hypnosis.
In addition, the fifth circuit noted, as have other courts," ' that the
right to confront adverse witnesses might be denied through the use of
hypnotically enhanced testimony." ' The argument is that through the ef-
fect of confabulation, suggestion, and the enhancement of the witness's
confidence and belief in the validity of his hypnotically enhanced recall,
the hypnosis renders the witness impervious to effective
cross-examination." ' Also, "the actual memory, or lack of it, is replaced,
analogously to erasing the contents of a magnetic tape by recording over
it. As a result, the subject's prior or 'real' memory and state of mind
are no longer available for scrutiny." '" 17 Thus, the defendant would be
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the witness as to his true
recollection and his real degree of confidence in it. It might be argued
that by allowing defense counsel the chance to examine a record of the
witness's pre-hypnosis recall and a video-record of the hypnosis session,
the problem would be avoided. It is questionable, however, whether such
safeguards provide an adequate substitute for having the unmodified
witness before the jury, since one of the purposes of the right to con-
frontation is to allow "the . . . jury to observe the demeanor of the
witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his
credibility.""' It can also be argued that, under California v. Green" 9
and associated cases, availability of the witness on the stand at trial is
sufficient to satisfy the right to confrontation. However, it is possible
to distinguish such cases from the hypnosis situation, the former relying
upon two implicit but crucial assumptions:
(1) when examination of the witness occurred at the preliminary
stage of a trial, there was opportunity to "test" the memory of
the witness before he forgot or disappeared, and (2) because the
witness was examined as to his initial perceptions, memory, at-
titudes, and sincerity, defendant in fact had fair and adequate
opportunity to cross-examine.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 232, 624 P.2d 1274, 1280 (1981); People
v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615, 627, 329 N.W.2d 743, 748 (1982), modified, 417 Mich. 968,
336 N.W.2d 751 (1983); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 546, 453 N.E.2d 484, 496, 466
N.Y.S.2d 255, 267 (1983).
115. 434 So. 2d at 83.
116. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 114; Margolin, supra note 39, at 46.
117. Alderman & Barrette, Hypnosis on Trial: A Practical Perspective on the Applica-
tion of Forensic Hypnosis in Criminal Cases, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 5, 31-32 (1982) (footnote
omitted).
118. State v. Kaufman, 304 So. 2d 300, 303 (La. 1974) (quoting California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
119. 399 U.S. 149 (1970); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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These assumptions, however, fail in the hypnosis cases. Once
hypnotized, a defendant loses all opportunity to cross examine
the original witness. The original witness's initial perceptions and
memory are crucial, but are lost to the hypnotic process. Most
frightening is that a witness will not even suspect this and will
usually assume his "new" memory is real, accurate, and
truthful. 120
Moreover, the guidelines adopted for use in confrontation problems were
designed for hearsay problems, and thus do not meet those which hyp-
nosis creates. 2 ' For example, hypnosis vitiates the prophylactic function
of the oath, because the witness is not aware that his new recall may
be largely confabulation, and thus cannot knowingly perjure himself
because he is not purposefully swearing to what he believes to be untrue.'22
It is argued that the right of confrontation is not denied because "cross-
examination is usually conducted with the benefit of independent evidence.
Such independent evidence can be used to impeach a witness if it includes
prior inconsistent statements or the contradictory testimony of other credi-
ble witnesses."' 23 Also, defense counsel can question the witness's ability
to perceive or remember as of the time of the events at issue.2 ' This
argument ignores the fact that when the police resort to hypnosis it is
often because there is no other independent evidence. Also, there may
be no prior inconsistent statement by the witness to be used for impeach-
ment if the case is one in which the witness has no memory of the events
at all prior to the hypnosis, and a pre-hypnosis statement that is inconsis-
tent with a post-hypnosis statement can be conveniently explained away
by the allegedly accurate restorative effect on the witness's memory.
Finally, some proponents of hypnosis advocate its use for bolstering
any- witness's confidence and reducing nervousness. 2 However, this
weakens the argument that any change in the witness's demeanor and sub-
jective belief in the accuracy of his hypnotically enhanced recollection is
not sufficiently significant to affect the ability to cross-examine him. Such
an application of hypnosis is highly questionable. If the witness has no
memory malfunction, then there should be no need to use hypnosis merely
120. Beaver, supra note 25, at 197 n.255.
121. Id. at 197.
122. Id. at 199.
123. Note, A wakening from the Exclusionary Trance: A Balancing Approach to the Ad-
missibility of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony, 61 TEX. L. REV. 719, 728 (1982) (foot-
notes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Note, Awakening).
124. Id., see also People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 388, 385 N.E.2d 848, 855
(1979); Falk, supra note 43, at 55. The arguable immunity from the oath and the threat
of perjury has also been criticized. See Note, Awakening, supra note 123, at 727 (citing
Note, A Reconsideration of the Sworn Testimony Requirement: Securing Truth in the Twen-
tieth Century, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1681 (1977)).
125. See, e.g., W. BRYAN, supra note 9, at 194; Rothblatt, supra note 15, 618-19.
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because the witness is nervous and can use a little more self-confidence.
The jury is fully capable of realizing that witnesses are frequently ner-
vous and can often tell the difference between a devastating cross-
examination of an insincere witness and one which destroys the testimony
of an honest, sincere, but hopelessly confused or intimidated witness. In
fact, the latter situation might even damage the cross-examining party
because the jury might sympathize with the witness and think that the
opponent's case is weak if he must resort to such tactics. In any case,
the use of hypnosis merely for witness preparation when there is no recall
problem seems to involve both constitutional and ethical complications.
In State v. Wren, the officer who had observed the defendants in
an auto at the scene of the kidnapping which preceded the murder was
hypnotized to refresh his recollection in order to improve his description
of a woman occupant of the auto. The effort was unsuccessful, and the
officer's identification of the defendants was unchanged. The trial court
denied the defendants' motion to suppress the officer's testimony.' 26 The
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, specifically declining to rule on the
admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony, because it found that
technically there was no such testimony in the case: the witness's pre-
and post-hypnosis identifications of the two defendants were the same,
and the court found that the hypnosis had not produced any additional
facts which were not already known to the police.' The court went on
to state in dictum: "[e]ven if the hypnosis tainted [the prosecution's
witness's] testimony, there does exist an independent basis to establish
the accuracy of his identification of [the defendants], since nothing was
obtained through the hypnotic session that was inconsistent with any of
[the prosecution's witness's] prior statements."' 2 8 The court agreed with
the prosecution's argument that skillful cross-examination could ferret out
any inconsistencies in the witness's testimony. The court then held that
under this set of facts (no inconsistent information derived from the hyp-
nosis, and corroboration by the witness's two pre-hypnosis statements of
the post-hypnosis statements), the issue of the witness's hypnosis was a
matter of weight rather than admissibility. The court noted that the defen-
dant could "always counter the proffered evidence with expert testimony
highlighting any questions as to the reliability"' 9 of the witness's testimony
as a result of the hypnosis.
Justice Calogero concurred in the decision to the extent that it admit-
ted testimony based on pre-hypnosis recall, but dissented otherwise. He
stated that notwithstanding its statement to the contrary, the majority did
"nevertheless hold that the witness can testify concerning an identifica-
126. 425 So. 2d 756, 757-58 (La. 1983).
127. Id. at 758-59.
128. Id. at 758.
129. Id. at 759.
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tion he made of the defendants after the hypnosis and he can give at
trial the more detailed description which only after the hypnosis he was
able to recite. '"" Justice Calogero would hold that a witness is not allowed
to testify as to post-hypnosis descriptions or identifications. 3 '
It is clear that at a minimum, the decision in Wren represents a re-
jection of the California approach which excludes all testimony by a
previously hypnotized witness. 32 However, while the language of the ma-
jority suggests that the court may in the future adopt the admissibility
per se approach, such an outcome need not necessarily follow. The Wren
holding should be limited to the particular facts of the case: If the hyp-
nosis does not produce new information which casts doubt on the pre-
hypnosis recall and if the pre-hypnosis recall corroborates the post-hypnosis
recall, the witness is competent to testify. It is interesting to note, however,
that the defendants sought only to have the witness declared incompetent
to testify and apparently did not challenge the particulars of the hypnosis
session. As a result, the court only had an opportunity to compare the
two extreme approaches, and it only cited cases supporting either the ad-
missibility per se approach or the exclusion per se approach.' The absence
of any discussion of the cases which support a conditional admissibility
approach makes it impossible to predict what the court would do with
a situation in which there was a significant difference between a witness's
pre-hypnosis and post-hypnosis recall.
The most disquieting aspect of the Wren decision is the majority's
agreement with the prosecution's argument that skillful cross-examination
of the witness could bring out any inconsistencies in his testimony and
diminish his credibility. 3 " Given that there are significant sixth amend-
ment rights involved in the admission of hypnotically enhanced
130. Id. at 760 (Calogero, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The additional
details included the defendant's height, age, build, complexion, and hair style as recalled
by the witness under hypnosis. Id. at 758.
131. Id. at 760.
132. For a discussion of the California approach, see supra text accompanying note
64. In State v. Goutro, 444 So. 2d 615 (La. 1984), noted supra note 2, Justice Lemmon
writes in concurrence:
At this point, Louisiana courts have only taken one step: We have refused to
follow those decisions which bar all testimony by a witness who has been sub-
jected to hypnosis concerning the events about which he is to testify. We have
held only that the witness' testimony is admissible when the state proves that
the hypnosis had no effect on the wtiness' recall of events related before hypnosis.
Id. at 618.
133. 425 So. 2d at 759. The court did cite Hurd as one case which represents the posi-
tions that hypnosis should be treated just as any other method of refreshing recollection,
i.e., its use goes to credibility rather than admissibility, and that skillful cross-examination
would be adequate to attack the witness's credibility. However, the Hurd safeguards were
not mentioned. See supra note 89.
134. Id. at 758-59.
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testimony,' perhaps this dictum should be narrowly confined to the facts
of the case, i.e., no significant change in the witness's testimony and cor-
roboration from pre-hypnosis recall. In addition, the court's statement
that the defendant could always offer expert testimony to question the
witness's reliability'3" is troubling because it fails to consider the possibility
raised in Culpepper that there may not be enough qualified hypnosis ex-
perts to go around. Also, there is the problem of providing such experts
for indigent defendants.
Civil Cases
Landry v. Bill Garrett Chevrolet, Inc. is apparently the only Loui-
siana civil case, and one of the very few state civil cases, to address the
admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony.' 37 In Landry, the plain-
tiff sued to recover damages for personal injuries arising from a single-
car accident. He was hypnotized in order to permit him to recall the events
surrounding the accident. The trial court admitted his testimony as
refreshed recollection, adopting the admissibility per se approach: The fact
that the plaintiff's memory had been refreshed through hypnosis was held
to be a credibility question for the jury.'38 The fourth circuit rejected
that approach and reversed, adopting a conditional admissibility approach:
Hypnotically refreshed testimony should not be excluded as a matter of
law, but a balancing approach should be used in conjunction with pro-
cedural safeguards similar to those adopted in Hurd. Specifically, the court
stated:
[tihe trial judge should require that a foundation be laid prior
to receiving testimony induced by hypnosis. That foundation
should satisfy the trial court that: (1) the hypnosis was performed
by competent qualified personnel; (2) that the method employed
is acceptable in the [scientific] community; (3) that the witness
was not unduly influenced, or subjected to suggestions about issues
135. See supra text accompanying notes 114-25.
136. See supra text accompanying note 129.
137. The only other civil case in Louisiana which dealt with the admissibility of hypnosis-
related evidence is Watson v. Morrison, 340 So. 2d 588 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), in which
the court held that a psychiatrist/hypnotist's testimony describing statements made by the
defendant during hypnosis was inadmissible hearsay, but that the same witness's testimony
as to what hypnosis technique he used and its reliability was admissible as proper expert
testimony. Apparently, there was no objection to the mention of the use of hypnosis. The
court did express reservations about the accuracy of hypnotic recall and the problem of
undue influence from external sources on the subject.
One of the few civil cases in other jurisdictions is Lemieux v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz.
214, 644 P.2d 1300 (1982), in which the court followed its earlier holding in State ex rel.
Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982), and held that hypnotically
induced testimony is inadmissible in a civil trial. Lemieux, 132 Ariz. at 217, 644 P.2d at 1303.
138. 430 So. 2d 1051, 1053-54 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
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material to the case; (4) that the witness did have a true memory
loss prior to hypnosis, and that his testimony is essential to the
case. 1
39
The opponent would be allowed to attack the credibility of the witness
or "the credibility of hypnosis," with "whatever evidence he deems,
necessary,"'"" but the factfinder would have the final decision as to
credibility.'" In adopting this approach, the fourth circuit did not discuss
two important features of the usual conditional admissibility approach:
The requirement that the proponent notify the other party of his intent
to offer hypnotically enhanced testimony and the access by the opponent
to the records of the hypnosis session. In addition, although videotape
recordings of two of the the three hypnosis interviews were a part of the
record, the fourth circuit was silent as to whether and what type of record-
ing would be required.
A divided supreme court granted writs and, in a very terse statement,
reversed the fourth circuit's ruling on the hypnosis issue and remanded
the case to that court for a decision on the merits on the basis of the
record before it.' 2 While it might be argued that this treatment indicates
an approval of the trial court's disposition of the issue, it could be
countered that the supreme court merely wanted the fourth circuit to make
a decision on the merits, in keeping with Gonzales v. Xerox Corporation,'3
and might ultimately approve of an approach to the hypnosis issue dif-
ferent from both that of the trial court and the fourth circuit. Thus, it
appears that by treating the matter in this way, the supreme court has
left itself much room for further development in this area.
The fourth circuit's approach seems to be inadequate. Although con-
stitutional problems do not arise to the same extent in civil cases as in
criminal cases, there do appear to be significant ethical problems in unfet-
tered use of hypnosis to enhance a witness's memory. To the extent that
the witness's demeanor is evidence of his credibility, the use of hypnosis
for any purpose tends to destroy that evidence by unduly increasing the
witness's confidence in the accuracy of his testimony. In the absence of
adherence to safeguards such as those espoused under the conditional ad-
139. Id. at 1056-57.
140. Id. at 1057.
141. Id.
142. "[Writs) [g]ranted. The ruling of the court of appeal concerning the hypnotically-
enhanced testimony is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court of appeal to decide
on the merits on the record before it. Gonzales v. Xerox Corp., 320 So. 2d 163 (La. 1975)."
Landry v. Bill Garrett Chevrolet, Inc., 434 So. 2d 1103, 1105 (La. 1983). Both parties had
appealed, and on Landry's appeal, Justices Dennis, Blanche, and Lemmon dissented, id.
at 1105, while on Bill Garrett Chevrolet's appeal, Justices Blanche and Lemmon dissented.
Id. at 1103.
143. Gonzales v. Xerox Corp., 320 So. 2d 163 (La. 1975).
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missibility approach, there would arguably be a danger of violation of
the Louisiana State Bar Association's Canons of Ethics.'
4 4
Recommendations
On the basis of the foregoing, it appears that there is still no definite
rule as to the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony in either
civil or criminal cases in Louisiana. Whereas the Louisiana Supreme Court
has not fully committed itself on this issue, it is hoped that some of the
following suggestions will be considered.
Each approach that the Louisiana courts could take has significant
disadvantages. The admissibility per se approach does not allow the court
to assess adequately the costs of unconditionally admitting hypnotically
enhanced testimony, and the costs may be particularly high in a criminal
case. The exclusion per se approach would tend to keep potentially pro-
bative evidence from the trier of fact. The conditional admissibility ap-
proach provides only a partial solution, and, depending on the exten-
siveness of the safeguards adopted, there may be a tendency to confuse
the issues and mislead the jury, as well as to cause undue delay or waste
of time.
Considering that two groups of hypnosis experts have expressed deep
concern with forensic use of hypnosis by police,' that the professional
community as a whole is sharply divided on the issue, and that there are
many problems with hypnosis, it would seem prudent for the courts to
approach the issue with caution. Thus, because the admissibility per se
approach provides no safeguards whatsoever, it would seem better to avoid
it in both criminal and civil cases.
In criminal cases, unless sufficiently protective safeguards can be
developed without further straining the already overburdened court system,
hypnotically enhanced testimony should be excluded as a matter of law.
To be sufficiently protective of the rights of the accused, any set of
safeguards should include, as a mandatory minimum, the following: First,
the Hurd safeguards should be adopted. Second, a requirement of notice
to the defendant similar to that required by State v. Prieur'" should be
adopted, since hypnotically enhanced testimony has great potential for
prejudicing the defendant, much the same as other crimes evidence. Third,
in order to allow the defendant to make out a defense, defense counsel
should have the assistance of an expert on hypnosis, and if the defendant
is indigent, one should be appointed for him.' 7 Since defense counsel
144. "A lawyer shall not supress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation
to reveal or produce." LA. CODE OF PROF. RESP. DR 7-109(A) (found in ARTICLES OF IN-
CORP., LA. STATE BAR ASS'N, art. XVI; LA. R.S. tit. 37, ch. 4, app. (1974)).
145. See supra note 19.
146. 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
147. See State v. Madison, 345 So. 2d 485, 489-90 (La. 1977), and authorities cited therein.
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is highly unlikely to be qualified as such an expert, his ability to evaluate
the records of the hypnosis session for defects which can be used to at-
tack admissibility or credibility of the testimony would seem to require
such assistance. Fourth, the record of the hypnosis session should be
videotaped. Unless the conduct of the hypnotist and the subject during
the interview can be seen as well as heard, no effective evaluation of it
can be made. Fifth, defense counsel should have access to the video record-
ing of the hypnosis session, as well as to the records of the witness's
pre-hypnosis and post-hypnosis recall,'I with the right to introduce any
portions of these necessary to permit effective cross-examination should
the testimony be admitted. Sixth, if the testimony is admitted, the pro-
secution should not be allowed to introduce any of these records, except
as may be relevant for rehabilitation of the testimony after the defense
has attacked its credibility or the reliability of the particular hypnosis pro-
cedure used. This would allow the defense to choose whether to risk the
possibility of any undue impact on the jury, and in keeping with this,
the initial mention of the use of hypnosis is to be made only by the
defense. Seventh, if the testimony is admitted and the defense does at-
tack its reliability, the judge should be required to give a strong cautionary
instruction to the jury regarding the weight to be assigned to the testimony.
Eighth, if the testimony is admitted, the defense should be allowed to
offer expert testimony on the reliability of the particular hypnosis techni-
que used and the manner in which the session was conducted, i.e., whether
in the particular case the technique used was capable of reliably refreshing
the witness's recall."4 9 The expert would not be allowed to testify as to
the reliability of hypnosis as a memory enhancement technique in general
or as to the trustworthiness of the witness's ability to observe, recall, and
148. The approach of State v. Tharp, 284 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973), holding that the defense
is entitled to inspect a writing, report, or memorandum used by the witness on the stand,
and State v. Perkins, 310 So. 2d 591 (La. 1975), holding that the defense is entitled to
production of memorandum from which the witness prepared notes used at trial to refresh
his recall only when the notes are used at trial, should be extended to the hypnosis situa-
tion. In State v. Lane, 302 So. 2d 880 (La. 1974), the court refused to extend this rule
to the case of a memorandum used by a witness to refresh his recall prior to trial, and
it may be argued that the use of hypnosis to refresh a witness's memory is analogous to
the use of a memorandum prior to trial, so that Lane would control. However, the analogy
breaks down when one considers that a memorandum does not present the same problems
of suggestiveness, confabulation, and undue influence as does hypnosis. Also, it would seem
that such records would be discoverable under article 718 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure.
149. This would not be barred by the holding of State v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939 (La.
1982), in which the court held that expert testimony by a psychiatrist concerning the quality
of an eyewitness identification is inadmissible. In that case the expert testimony was offered
on the issue of the reliability of the witness's ability to perceive, remember, and articulate.
In the case of hypnotically enhanced testimony, the expert would be testifying on the reliability
of the particular hypnosis procedure in refreshing the witness's memory, regardless of the
witness's capacities for observation, unaided recall, and communication.
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communicate. The prosecution should be allowed to offer similar expert
testimony on rebuttal. The prosecution must bear the burden of showing
by clear and convincing evidence that the testimony was not the product
of an unduly suggestive procedure and that the reliability of the testimony
at least approximates that of ordinary recall refreshed by more traditional
means. In addition, the prosecution should be required to show that, when
the witness testifies only as to matters recalled prior to the hypnosis, the
testimony was also not affected by the use of the hypnosis.
The obvious problem with such a set of requirements is its cost. Such
requirements would introduce greater likelihood of confusion of issues,
undue delay, and waste of time, and having yet another issue on which
to make an interlocutory appeal adds further delay. The time required
for the judge to hear arguments preliminary to making his ruling on the
admissibility of the testimony adds to the length of already heavily-loaded
preliminary proceedings. The trial is likely to be lengthened by the in-
troduction of expert testimony by both sides in the event that the testimony
is admitted and the defense attacks its reliability. The appointment of
yet another expert for an indigent defendant only adds to the public ex-
pense of obtaining justice, and there may not be enough experts to go
around among all defendants, thus raising the possibility of further delays
in the form of continuances while the defense or the prosecution waits
for its expert to finish testifying elsewhere.
However, the stringency of such safeguards may provide a solution
for at least some of the problems. To the extent that the safeguards in-
duce law enforcement agencies to carefully limit use of hypnosis as a
memory enhancer to only those cases in which there is a reasonable chance
that the witness's recall may be revived, and in which the testimony is
essential to the case, the case load involving this type of evidence is likely
to be small, and thus the costs of such safeguards may be outweighed
by the benefits. Finally, it should be noted that the use of the hypnosis
is not restricted to the prosecution, and that when the defense seeks to
use it to adduce evidence, some of the safeguards listed above would prob-
ably have to yield to the right to make out a defense. 5 '
Since the constitutional problems are not as significant in civil cases,
it is possible to justify admission of hypnotically enhanced testimony while
excluding such testimony in criminal cases. Although an argument might
be made for a case by case approach in civil cases, it seems best that
some mandatory safeguards be adopted to avoid even a hint of ethical
impropriety. The proponent should be required to notify the other party
and the court of his intent to offer hypnotically enhanced testimony. Every
contact between the hypnotist and the subject should be videotaped, and
150. Cf. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973).
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only the hypnotist and the subject should be present at the interview,
with others being allowed to observe only via a television monitor or one-
way screen. Audio or video records should be made both of the informa-
tion concerning the case given to the hypnotist prior to the session and
of all details of the subject's pre-hypnosis recall. Those records, along
with the videotape of the session itself, should be made available upon
request to the opponent prior to trial, in accordance with the rules of
discovery.'' The proponent should have the burden of establishing, either
at a pretrial hearing or at a hearing out of the presence of the jury, that
these requirements have been met. In addition, the judge would then have
the duty to determine whether the probative value of the evidence
outweighs the risks of its admission. For example, the court could con-
sider whether the hypnotist was sufficiently qualified, whether the session
was unduly suggestive, and whether, in light of the rest of the evidence,
the testimony would merely be cumulative. Once the proponent has shown
that the safeguards were fulfilled, the opponent would have the burden
of convincing the court to exclude the testimony.
Finally, in both civil and criminal cases, where the court learns that
either side has used hypnosis merely to prepare the witness, that is, to
bolster his testimony against cross-examination, the court should disqualify
that witness from testifying. Such a rule would reduce the incentive to
use hypnosis for such a questionable purpose.
Frederick E. Chemay
151. The records of the hypnosis session and of the pre-hypnosis recall would seem to
be discoverable under articles 1421-1428 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, as
analogous to physical and mental examinations. If necessary, an exception should be made
to the health care provider privilege of LA. R.S. 13:3734, so that these records would be
discoverable under articles 1421 and 1422. Given the highly suggestive nature of hypnosis
and its attendant problems, it does not seem that the requirement of a showing of unfair
prejudice under article 1424 would bar discovery of the hypnosis session records.
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